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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the first three weeks of November 2003, thousands of protesters 
convened in Miami, Florida to protest the Free Trade Area of Americas 
negotiations.1  Hundreds of the protesters were arrested.2  On November 21, a “jail 
                                                                 
∗ J.D. expected, May 2010, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of 
Law; B.A. Loyola College Maryland (now known as Loyola University Maryland).  The 
author would like to thank all those who assisted him in the composition of this Note, 
especially Joshua Klarfeld, Sheldon Gelman, and his fellow members of the Cleveland State 
Law Review. 
1 Tamara Lush, Miami Police Keep Lid on Trade Protesters, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
(Nov. 21, 2003), http://www.sptimes.com/2003/11/21/State/Miami_police_keep_lid.shtml. 
Protesters gathered in Miami to protest the “world’s largest proposed free trade area.”  Id.  The 
week-long protest was massive, with reports of a gathering of up to 12,000 current and retired 
union members in one location.  Id.  The vast majority of the protesters were peaceful. Id. 
However, the violence (and subsequent arrests) was reportedly sparked by “young anarchists, 
who oppose government and all forms of societal hierarchy.”  Id. 
2 Steve Ellman, Free-Trade Protesters Eye Suits Over Treatment (Jan. 9, 2004), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1073157024071. Ellman’s article focused on Laura 
Ripple, a twenty-one-year-old woman who alleged police abuse after she was arrested for 
unlawful assembly, a criminal misdemeanor.  Id.  According to Ripple’s personal account:  
[S]he found herself being half-carried and half-dragged, fully dressed, into a makeshift 
shower for “decontamination.” After the shower, she was surrounded by four male 
officers in full-body hazardous material suits and gas masks.  In a daze, she realized 
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solidarity rally” was held in front of the Miami-Dade County Pre-Trial Detention 
Center3 to protest the detention of those who had been arrested earlier.4  Among 
those participating in the rally was Judith Haney, a fifty-year-old Oakland, California 
native who worked as a management employee for a biotechnology corporation.5  
During this rally, Haney, three other women, and three other men were sitting on the 
sidewalk across from the Center when they were arrested for “failing to disburse.”6  
They were immediately escorted across the street and into the Detention Center for 
processing.7 
                                                          
they were cutting off her clothes with scissors.  She was left naked.  Her clothes and 
possessions were thrown into the garbage.  “I screamed and asked for a female officer 
but they ignored me,” she said.  She was handed a paper hospital gown, and later 
given prison garb to wear.  She made bail at 3 the next morning.  “I was completely 
shocked,” Ripple said.  “I felt violated.” 
Id.  It appears Ripple was arrested at the same peaceful protest as Judith Haney.  Id.  See 
Haney Statement, infra note 4, at 1.  
3 The Miami-Dade County Pre-Trial Detention Center is a 1,712 bed booking facility, 
“which processes and houses all classifications of inmates” ranging “from traffic offenders to 
capital offenders.” Miami-Dade County Corrections, http://www.miamidade.gov/ 
corrections/pre_trial_detention.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
4 Judith Haney, Statement of Judy Haney to the Commission on Safety and Abuse in 
America’s Prisons 1 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/ 
haney_judith.pdf [hereinafter Haney Statement].  Ms. Haney’s statement and case were 
brought to this author’s attention by Margo Schlanger’s pre-Powell overview of jail strip 
search litigation.  See Margo Schlanger, Jail Strip-Search Cases: Patterns and Participants, 
71 SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 67-73 (2008).  Beginning in March 2005, The 
Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons was:  
[a year-long exploration of] violence and abuse in America’s prisons and jails and how 
to make correctional facilities safer for prisoners and staff and more effective in 
promoting public safety and public health.  The Commission examined dangerous 
conditions of confinement—violence, poor medical and mental health care, and 
inappropriate segregation—that can also endanger the public; the challenges facing 
labor and management; weak oversight of correctional facilities; and serious flaws in 
available data about violence and abuse in prisons and jails.  The Commission’s 
findings and a set of 30 practical recommendations for operating correctional facilities 
that reflect America’s values and serve our best interests are captured in the report, 
Confronting Confinement.  
The Commission is co-chaired by former United States Attorney General 
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach and the Honorable John Gibbons, former Chief Judge of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.  The 20-member panel 
includes Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, those who run 
correctional systems and those who litigate on behalf of prisoners, scholars, and 
individuals with a long history of public service and deep experience in the 
administration of justice.  The Commission is staffed by and funded through the Vera 
Institute of Justice. 
Commission on Safety and Abuse, Mission, http://www.prisoncommission.org/mission.asp 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2010). 
5 Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 10, 15, Haney v. Miami-Dade County, No. 04-20516, 2004 
WL 2868044, (S.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2004). 
6 Id. at ¶ 11.  
7 Haney Statement, supra note 4, at 1.   
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Haney and the women were led down a long hallway lined with several small 
rooms, where they were sat down on a bench.8  A guard removed one of the women 
from the group and placed her into one of these small rooms.9  Moments later, 
Haney overheard the guard asking the woman to remove her clothes.10  Haney’s 
mind began racing.  She described her thoughts: 
                                                                
Hearing that startled and surprised me.  We had not done anything that 
involved drugs or weapons; we were behaving peacefully and had been 
compliant with the requests of the corrections officers during the booking 
process. . . . 
I leaned over to the young woman to my left and said in a very quiet 
voice, “Are they strip searching us? That’s unconstitutional.”  I’m not sure 
I’d even taken a breath when the guard standing nearest came over to me 
and in a very severe tone asked, “Are you refusing?” 
What happened next happened very quickly, but in my mind I had a lot to 
consider.  I knew that the likelihood was close to zero that if I responded, 
“Yes, I’m refusing—this is an unreasonable search and is 
unconstitutional,” that the guard would say, “Oh, all right—we won’t do it 
then.” 
. . . If I refused, would they punish not only me, but the women arrested 
with me?  While I was considering what I would do, the other women on 
the bench responded to the guard for me—saying in unison “No, she’s not 
refusing.”  This all happened very quickly, and I knew that I wasn’t ready 
to risk the possible consequences of refusing to be strip searched as well 
as putting the other women in jeopardy.11 
When it was Haney’s turn to be searched, she was taken to the same small, 6' x 8' 
room in which the others had been.12  She was told to face the guard, who was 
standing in the doorway, and ordered to remove her clothing piece by piece.13  She 
further described the experience:   
After I removed all my clothes, the guard told me to turn around, bend all 
the way over, and spread my cheeks.  I’m not sure that I can really convey 
the emotional and physical complexity of the situation.  Bending over and 
“spreading my cheeks” exposed my genitalia and anus to a complete 
stranger, who had physical authority over me, so that she could visually 
inspect my body cavities.  The only way I could cope with this was to stay 
 
8 Id. at 1-2.  
9 Id. at 2.  
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. 
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very focused in my head and just separate from my body.  The feeling was 
sort of like floating while also feeling like a big lump. 
The guard’s next set of instructions were to squat—and then—to hop like 
a bunny.  Remember, I’m still “spreading my cheeks,” so I can’t use my 
arms to balance or assist me in the hopping process . . . . 
I stood, bent over, and hopped naked under orders and in view of at least 
two guards in a small room with a door open to a hallway that passersby 
could see in for about 10 to 15 minutes.  My genitalia and anus were 
exposed and viewable to anyone passing through the hallway for over 5 
minutes.14 
Shortly thereafter, Haney sought counsel and filed a federal class-action suit against 
Miami-Dade County, claiming the County’s blanket strip search booking policy 
violated her and other arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights.15  In April 2005, the 
parties settled for $6.2 million.16 Fortunately for Haney and her fellow class 
members, this settlement occurred several years prior to the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling 
in Powell v. Barrett.17  Had their case been analyzed under the rationale set forth in 
Powell, it is likely that the court would have found the above strip search to be 
entirely permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish explored the scope of a blanket 
policy that required inmates, including pre-trial detainees, to be strip searched after 
each planned visit with a person from outside the institution.18  It held that such 
searches may be conducted on “less than probable cause” and provided a multifactor 
test to be conducted in each case in order to balance “the need for the particular 
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”19  Since then, 
the circuit courts have many times faced the issue of the validity of prison policies 
that require strip searches to be conducted as a part of an arrestee’s booking 
                                                                 
14 Id. at 3-4. 
15 Class Action Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 1. 
16 Associated Press, Miami agrees to pay $6 million to women who were strip-searched, 
(April 19, 2005), http://www.courttv.com/news/2005/0419/strip_ap.html (last visited Oct. 20, 
2008).  The article noted: 
[Haney and the two other women from her group] were joined by four other plaintiffs, 
and the seven will divide $300,000, under the settlement.  Thousands of others strip-
searched in the county between March 2000 and February 2005 could get awards 
ranging from $10 to thousands of dollars.  In all, those searched could receive $4.85 
million, with the rest of the roughly $6.2 million settlement going to attorney’s and 
administration fees and expenses. 
Id.  See also Stipulation of Settlement at ¶ 28, Haney v. Miami-Dade County, No. 04-20516 
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2005). 
17 Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
18 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  
19 Id. at 558-60.  
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process.20  Amazingly, through the use of the balancing test in Bell, these courts 
have been nearly unanimous in their conclusions: a reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the arrestees were concealing contraband is necessary in order for such searches 
to be considered “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.21 
                                                                
On September 4, 2008, however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
Powell v. Barrett, upheld a blanket strip search policy used in booking arrestees, 
regardless of whether there was any reasonable suspicion to believe that the arrestees 
were concealing contraband.22  The Court in Powell applied the Bell balancing test, 
but, running counter to nearly thirty years of judicial interpretation, held that 
virtually all of the federal circuits, including their own, were incorrect in their prior 
holdings, which required an existence of reasonable suspicion to conduct such a 
search.23  In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit, in essence, established a per se rule 
allowing strip searches—an act that has been described by circuit courts as 
“demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, 
embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and submission”24 and has 
 
20 See, e.g., Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2001) (“This court recognizes 
that ‘reasonable suspicion’ is sufficient to justify the strip search of a pretrial detainee.”); 
Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[S]trip and visual body cavity searches must 
be justified by at the least a reasonable suspicion.”); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 
(6th Cir. 1989) (“[A] strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor 
offense not normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no individualized 
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon or other contraband, 
is unreasonable.”); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986) (“We hold that the Fourth 
Amendment precludes prison officials from performing strip/body cavity searches of arrestees 
charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a reasonable 
suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime 
charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the arrest.”); 
Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[W]e hold that arrestees charged with 
minor offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials possess a reasonable 
suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband.”), overruled on 
other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc); Stewart v. Lubbock County, 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Because Lubbock 
County’s strip search policy was applied to minor offenders awaiting bond when no 
reasonable suspicion existed that they as a category of offenders or individually might possess 
weapons or contraband, under the balancing test of Wolfish we find such searches 
unreasonable and the policy to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”); Mary Beth G. v. 
City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1273 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e agree with the district court in 
Jane Does that ensuring the security needs of the City by strip searching plaintiffs-appellees 
was unreasonable without a reasonable suspicion by the authorities that either of the twin 
dangers of concealing weapons or contraband existed.”). 
21 Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343; Swain, 117 F.3d at 7; Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Weber, 804 
F.2d at 802; Giles, 746 F.2d at 617, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d 
at 1040 n.1; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273. 
22 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300.  
23 Id. at 1310. 
24 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. 
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“instinctively give[n] [the Supreme Court] most pause”25—to be conducted, absent 
any cause, on all arrestees during the process of booking.26 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Powell v. Barrett misinterpreted the rationale 
and balancing test provided by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish.  This 
misinterpretation lies in the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to recognize the fundamental 
factual distinctions between, and thus, the different justifications behind, strip 
searches of inmates after planned contact visits (as in Bell) and strip searches of 
arrestees as part of the facility’s booking process (as in the Powell and the 
“reasonable suspicion” cases).  Because of the difference between the facts in Bell 
and the facts set forth before it, the Eleventh Circuit should not have found the Bell 
case to be specifically controlling, and, in the alternative, should have found, as 
nearly all the federal circuits had before it, that reasonable suspicion is required to 
conduct strip searches of arrestees during the booking process.  
Part II of this Note will provide an historical judicial background of the decisions 
leading up to the Powell v. Barrett decision.  This section will first take a brief look 
at the history of the prison strip search before conducting an in-depth analysis at the 
Bell v. Wolfish decision, including the facts, rationale, and ambiguities of the 
decision.  Next, this Note will examine the subsequent use of the Bell v. Wolfish 
decision by the federal courts in the context of strip searches conducted pursuant to 
facilities’ booking policies, focusing on the rise of the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard.  Part III of this Note will look at the decision in Powell itself.  This section 
will start by examining the factual background of the case.  It will then delve into a 
detailed analysis of the rationale that the Eleventh Circuit employed to reach its 
decision and demonstrate why this rationale is misapplied in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish and the federal court decisions that followed.  
Finally, this Note will examine reactions from other circuit courts since the Eleventh 
Circuit decided Powell. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Fourth Amendment Historical Background 
The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.27 
The plain language of the amendment states that one only has a right to be free from 
searches that are “unreasonable” in nature.28  As expected, the historical 
                                                                 
25 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558. 
26 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1316. 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that 
the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  
28 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Gabriel M. Helmer, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: 
A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U.  L. REV. 239, 243 (2001). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/8
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development of the Fourth Amendment has been largely consumed by the debate 
over what, in fact, constitutes an “unreasonable” (or “reasonable”) search.29  
However, in the context of prisons, the historical debate, for the majority of the 
Fourth Amendment’s existence, has not been whether searches of those in prisons, 
including arrestees, were “reasonable” or “unreasonable,” but whether such persons 
were even afforded certain rights under the Constitution.30  Until the mid-twentieth 
century, the answer was clear: They were not.31  
Gabriel Helmer, in his article Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for 
Reasonable Suspicion, provides a thorough look at the history of prison strip 
searches in the United States.32  He notes that the ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment essentially brought no change to the rights of arrestees.33  Those 
entering jails in the early 1800s were “still routinely stripped and examined.”34  
Quoting a work on the history of imprisonment in the United States, Helmer remarks 
on the brutality and inhumanity of the searches that continued to exist under the 
Fourth Amendment:  
The prison authorities put their new arrival through a crunching but 
meticulously organized admission ritual, which, besides degrading him, 
was meant to extract every kind of personal information, for entry into the 
prison record he never was permitted to see.  There was the mortification 
of being stripped naked in front of others, and the mortification of being 
exposed to naked others.  He was probed and tested, and layer by layer his 
individuality was stripped away, and he was assigned a new identity. . . .35  
Not only were such acts being carried out, but they were, in essence, being permitted 
by the courts.36  Helmer notes the “slaves of the state” concept some courts adopted 
prior to the civil rights movement when establishing prisoners’ individual rights:  
A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement 
in the penitentiary instead of with death, is subject while undergoing that 
punishment, to all the laws which the Legislature in its wisdom may enact 
. . . .  He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, 
                                                                 
29 Helmer, supra note 28, at 243-44. 
30 Id. at 248.  
31 Id. (citing SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF 
IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 251-52 (1998)) (noting that “[i]nmates were not entitled to life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and later, “Americans’ constitutional rights effectively 
stopped at the prison gate”). 
32 Helmer, supra note 28, at 242-50. 
33 Id. at 247 (citing CHRISTIANSON, supra note 31, at 114) (describing how each convict 
arriving at the New York State Prison at Auburn during the mid 1820s “was admitted 
according to a carefully developed ritual.  First his irons were taken off and he was stripped 
naked by other convicts . . . under the watchful eyes of a keeper”). 
34 Helmer, supra note 28, at 247.  
35 Id. (quoting CHRISTIANSON, supra note 31, at 230). 
36 Helmer, supra note 28, at 249. 
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but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity 
accords to him.  He is for the time being a slave of the State.  He is 
civiliter mortuus; and his estate, if he has any is administered like that of a 
dead man.37 
During this time, the “courts employed a ‘hands-off’ approach that detained the 
Constitution at the prison gate”—providing “absolute deference to prison 
officials.”38  However, “[d]uring the 1940s courts limited this ‘hands-off’ approach,” 
with some holding that a “prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except 
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law 39.”   
                                                                
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, penal officials began to openly 
recognize “the value of preserving—to the maximum feasible extent—civil rights 
and privileges during incarceration.”40  Finally, in 1974 the Supreme Court, in Wolff 
v. McDonnell, held that “[t]here is no iron curtain between the Constitution and the 
prisons of this country.”41  Thus, “170 years after the ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment” both prisoners and arrestees gained some limited protection from the 
Bill of Rights.42 
B.  Bell v. Wolfish 
On November 28, 1975, just seventeen months after the Supreme Court’s 
proclamation in Wolff, Louis Wolfish, an inmate at the Metropolitan Correctional 
Center (“MCC”) in New York City, sought a writ of habeas corpus because of 
allegedly unconstitutional conditions at the facility.43  A week later, the suit was 
declared a class action on behalf of all inmates at the facility.44  
At the time of the action, the MCC was just several months old.45  The facility 
housed a wide variety of inmates, ranging from pretrial detainees to sentenced 
prisoners.46  Justice Rehnquist colorfully described the MCC as differing “markedly 
 
37 Id. (quoting Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871)).  
38 Helmer, supra note 28, at 249 (citing Abdul Wali v. Couglin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1029 (2d 
Cir. 1985)) (describing standards for reviewing claimed violations of prisoners’ rights).  
39 Helmer, supra note 28, at 249-50 (quoting Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th 
Cir. 1944)).  
40 Helmer, supra note 28, at 250 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND COUNCIL OF 
STATE GOVERNMENTS, COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND STANDARDS, 
V-3 (1972)). 
41 Helmer, supra note 28, at 250 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 
(1974)). 
42 Helmer, supra note 28, at 250. 
43 Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 121-23 (2d. Cir. 1978). 
44 Id. at 122. 
45 Id.  The MCC was opened in August, 1975.  Id. at 121. 
46 The MCC held pretrial detainees, convicted inmates awaiting sentencing or 
transportation to federal prison, convicted inmates who were serving relatively short sentences 
in a service capacity, convicted inmates who were being held at the MCC on writs to testify or 
stand trial, witnesses in protective custody, and persons incarcerated for contempt of court.  Id. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/8
2009] STRIPPED OF JUSTIFICATION 901 
from the familiar image of a jail; there are no barred cells, dank, colorless corridors, 
or clanging steel gates.  It was intended to include the most advanced and innovative 
features of modern design of detention facilities.”47  
Despite the facility’s modern design, the jail quickly encountered issues with 
overcrowding.48  Due to an “unprecedented rise in pretrial and sentenced” inmates, 
“the MCC’s administrators . . . pressed into service every square foot of space which 
conceivably could be used as sleeping space,” with many new arrivals “forced to 
sleep on sofas or cots in the common areas under the glare of constantly burning 
lights.”49  The result was the destruction of “any modicum of privacy for many 
pretrial detainees.”50  
These conditions were the impetus for the original action, but the petition was 
soon amended to include a “litany of woes [that] touched on almost all aspects of the 
institution’s conditions and practices,” including the facility’s strip search policy.51  
The policy consisted of “strip searching” every inmate at MCC after every contact 
visit with a person from outside the institution.52  If male, the search consisted of the 
inmate, “[i]n the presence of a corrections officer, . . . remov[ing] his clothes, 
display[ing] his armpits, open[ing] his mouth, rais[ing] his genitals, display[ing] the 
bottoms of his feet, and spread[ing] his buttocks for visual anal inspection.”53  
                                                          
at 123 n.6.  At the time of the district court’s order, the MCC was, in essence, a short-term 
detainment facility, with 50% of all MCC inmates spending less than thirty days at the facility 
and 73% less than sixty days.  United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 127 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).  Of the unsentenced detainees, over half spent ten days or less at the MCC, 
three-quarters were released within a month, and more than 85% were released within sixty 
days.  Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 129 n.25.  
47 Bell, 441 U.S. at 525. 
48 Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 122. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 123.  Including the strip search policy, this “litany of woes” also contained 
complaints of: 
inadequate phone service; . . . room searches outside the inmate’s presence; a 
prohibition against the receipt of packages or the use of personal typewriters; 
interference with, and monitoring of, personal mail; inadequate and arbitrary 
disciplinary and grievance procedures; inadequate classification of prisoners; improper 
treatment of non-English speaking inmates; unsanitary conditions; poor ventilation; 
inadequate and unsanitary food; the denial of furloughs; unannounced transfers; 
improper restrictions on religious freedom; and an insufficient and inadequately 
trained staff. 
Id. at 123 n.7.  With respect to modern complaints regarding prison conditions, it should be 
noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1997 requires prisoners to first exhaust 
administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court.  See Danielle M. McGill, To 
Exhaust or Not to Exhaust?: The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to 
Exhaust All Administrative Remedies Before Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court, 
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 129 (2003). 
52 Bell, 441 U.S. at 558. 
53Wolfish, 439 F. Supp. at 146. 
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Female inmates were subject to a similar procedure, with the inclusion of a visual 
vaginal inspection.54 
The district court described the act as “unpleasant, embarrassing, and 
humiliating” and “calculated to trigger, in the officer and inmate respectively, 
feelings of sadism, terror, and incipient masochism that no one alive could have 
failed to predict.”55  Weighing the fact that only one item of contraband had been 
found as a result of the policy, the court held that “[t]hese affronts, repulsive in the 
most evident respects, [were] not warranted by the suspicions” shown by the 
facility.56  The Second Circuit affirmed, holding: “The gross violation of personal 
privacy inherent in such a search cannot be outweighed by the government’s security 
interest in maintaining a practice of so little actual utility.”57  On October 2, 1978, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari 58.  
                                                                
Of the original “litany of woes” that were addressed by the district court, only 
five, including the strip search policy, were at issue before the Supreme Court.59  
Before addressing each issue individually, the Court acknowledged that “the 
problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections facility are not 
susceptible of easy solutions,” and thus, “[p]rison administrators therefore should be 
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and 
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline 
and to maintain institutional security.”60  The majority decision, scribed by Justice 
Rehnquist, then moved on to resolve the issue of the MCC’s strip search policy in 
just three paragraphs and three footnotes.61  In determining the reasonableness of the 
policy, the Court reasoned that “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.  In each 
case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 148.  It must be noted that the district court, while finding a visual body-cavity 
search impermissible, did provide that the MCC could conduct a less intrusive visual strip 
search: “[T]he demands of security are amply satisfied if inmates are required to disrobe, to 
have their clothing subjected to inspection, and to present open hands and arms to demonstrate 
the absence of concealed objects.”  Yet, the court did so with hesitation: “Even this much the 
court allows with grave reluctance, inviting reconsideration by wiser judges or respondents 
themselves in the more mature wisdom of future times.  Id.  The distinction between the visual 
strip search and the visual body-cavity search, for the purpose of this Note, are further 
discussed infra note 140. 
57 Wolfish, 573 F.2d at 131. 
58 Bell v. Wolfish, 439 U.S. 816 (1978). 
59 Bell, 441 U.S. at 520-22.  The four other issues were: the confinement of two inmates in 
cells originally intended for one; a rule prohibiting inmates from receiving hardcover books 
that were not mailed from publishers or bookstores; a rule prohibiting the receipt of outside 
packages of food and personal items; and a requirement that pretrial detainees remain outside 
their rooms during “shake-down” inspections.  The Court ruled in favor of the facility on all 
four of these issues.  Id. 
60 Id. at 547.  
61 Id. at 558-60.  
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of personal rights that the search entails.”62  The Court then provided a four-factor 
balancing test, which would be oft-applied by subsequent lower courts in the specific 
context of prison facilities: “Courts must consider the scope of the particular 
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and 
the place in which it is conducted.”63  
The opinion then attempted to apply this balancing test, albeit in an implicit and 
out-of-order fashion.  First, the Court combined the third and fourth factors 
(justification and place), noting that the “[s]muggling of money, drugs, weapons, and 
other contraband is all too common an occurrence.  And inmate attempts to secrete 
these items into the facility by concealing them in body cavities [have been] 
documented.”64  In addressing the lower courts’ belief that the searches were not 
justified, in part, because only one item of contraband had resulted from the searches 
under the policy, the Court held that such a fact was likely indicative of the 
effectiveness of the policy as a deterrent (as opposed to a lack of actual interest to 
smuggle items into the facility).65  In addressing the scope of the visual body-cavity 
search, the Court stated that it did not “underestimate the degree to which these 
searches may invade the personal privacy of inmates.”66  The Court also 
acknowledged that such searches have the possibility of being conducted in an 
abusive manner.67  However, the Court concluded that it would be improper to 
invalidate all searches of this kind just because of a rare potential for abuse.68  In 
closing, the Court restated the issue: “[W]e deal here with the question whether 
visual body-cavity inspections as contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be 
conducted on less than probable cause.”69  Without providing what specific level of 
cause, if any, is necessary, the Court stated that after “[b]alancing the significant and 
legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the 
inmates, we conclude that they can.”70  
Further muddling the issue of the level of cause required is Justice Powell’s 
dissent on the issue of the Court’s holding on body-cavity searches.71  The dissent, in 
                                                                 
62 Id. at 559. 
63 Id. (citing United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 
384 U.S. 757 (1966)). 
64 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 560.  
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Bell, 441 U.S. at 560.  The emphasized “ever,” as the Eleventh Circuit in Powell 
correctly interprets, refers to the prior sentence, which discusses the “manner of the search” 
factor of the balancing test.  The “ever” “served to underscore the assumption that the searches 
will be conducted in a non-abusive, reasonable manner.”  Powell, 541 F.3d at 1305-06.  
70 Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. 
71 Id. at 563.  
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its near-entirety, states: “In view of the serious intrusion on one’s privacy occasioned 
by such a search, I think at least some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion, 
should be required to justify the anal and genital searches described in this case.”72  
The interpretation of this dissent has been debated.  Some have viewed the dissent as 
a simple critique of the majority’s silence in failing to articulate a level of cause 
required to strip search a detainee,73 while others, such as the majority opinion in 
Powell, see the dissent as a strong indication that the reasonable suspicion standard 
was not applied or used in Bell, and thus should not, and cannot, be applied in 
subsequent cases.74 
In summary, the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish held that a policy requiring 
every inmate to be subject to a visual body-cavity search after every contact visit 
with a person from outside the institution was “reasonable” under the Fourth 
Amendment.75  The Court did not expressly state a specific level of cause required to 
conduct such searches, vaguely concluding that the searches could be “conducted on 
less than probable cause.”76  This conclusion was reached through the balancing of 
the scope, the manner, the justification, and the place of the search.77  
C.  Booking Strip Searches in Post-Bell Courts 
1.  The Issue of Interpretation 
The Bell decision has been criticized for not providing enough guidance for 
subsequent courts because it failed to expressly articulate a particular level of 
cause.78  It has been noted that the factors in the balancing test in Bell are not unlike 
the traditional and “common tools used to determine the extent of constitutional 
protection [under the Fourth Amendment]: the degree of individual violation 
balances against the importance and necessity of the public interest.”79  As a result, 
post-Bell courts were essentially left with a non-particularized balancing test, no 
explicitly mentioned level of cause (just “less than probable cause”), and a holding 
that only directly resolved one particular strip search policy (after contact visits).  
Because of the ambiguity of the decision, subsequent courts that had to determine 
the validity of prison facility strip searches that took place outside the particular 
context of contact visit had the difficult task of deciding how to apply and interpret 
                                                                 
72 Id. 
73See, e.g., Deborah L. MacGregor, Stripped of All Reason? The Appropriate Standard for 
Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities, 36 
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 172 (2003); Helmer, supra note 28, at 262. 
74 See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307-08.  
75 Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 559.  
78 Helmer, supra note 28, at 257. 
79 Id. at 258-59 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (“[T]here is ‘no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which 
the search [or seizure] entails.” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 
536-37 (1967) (alteration in original))). 
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the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell.  In the particular context of a booking strip 
search, should a court wish to uphold the facility’s policy, it could interpret Bell as 
not requiring any cause to conduct strip searches and determine that this 
interpretation of the Court’s holding should control searches taking place as part of 
the booking process, as well as searches after contact visits.  In contrast, should a 
court find the facility’s policy objectionable, it could distinguish from Bell and use 
the balancing test to establish at least some particular level of cause required to 
conduct strip searches as part of the booking process.  Incredibly, nearly all the 
federal courts faced with booking strip searches post-Bell chose the latter route, 
quickly selecting reasonable suspicion as the appropriate level of cause required.80  
2.  The Rise of Reasonable Suspicion  
The first court to apply a specific standard of cause required for booking strip 
searches was the Seventh Circuit in Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago.81  The 
plaintiffs were three women who were arrested as a result of minor traffic violations 
and subjected to the City of Chicago’s strip search policy that applied to all incoming 
detainees.82  The search was a visual body-cavity search similar to the one conducted 
in Bell.83  
The court refused to be controlled by the specific holding in Bell “because the 
particularized searches in that case were initiated under different circumstances.”84  
These “different circumstances” appeared to lie in what the court saw as different 
conditions upon which the search was predicated (searches conducted as part of the 
booking process rather than after each visit—noting the former cannot act as a 
deterrent) and different arrestees (minor misdemeanants as opposed to those 
“awaiting trial on serious federal charges”).85  In the latter “different circumstance,” 
the court mischaracterized the type of detainees held at the MCC in Bell.86  As noted 
earlier, those detained at the MCC ranged from witnesses held for protective orders 
to those serving, in general, short-term sentences for federal offenses; thus, most 
were not “awaiting serious federal charges.”87 
The court began its analysis by using the Bell balancing test as a touchstone to 
reach the conclusion that “[w]hile the need to assure jail security is a legitimate and 
substantial concern, we believe that, on the facts here, the strip searches bore an 
insubstantial relationship to security needs so that, when balanced against 
[plaintiffs’] privacy interests, the searches cannot be considered ‘reasonable.’”88  In 
                                                                 
80 See cases cited supra note 20.  
81 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d 1263. 
82 Id. at 1267.  Two women were arrested for outstanding parking tickets after being 
stopped for traffic violations.  The other woman was arrested when she failed to produce her 
driver’s license after a traffic stop.  Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 1272. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See supra text accompanying note 46.  
88 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273.   
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establishing a reasonableness standard, the court stated the need for an “objective 
standard” of measure89 and cited the established rule that “[t]he more intrusive the 
search, the closer governmental authorities must come to demonstrating probable 
cause for believing that the search will uncover the objects for which the search is 
being conducted.”90 Pursuant to these principles, the court held “that ensuring the 
security needs of the City by strip searching [plaintiffs] was unreasonable without a 
reasonable suspicion by the authorities that either of the twin dangers of concealing 
weapons or contraband existed.”91 
The Seventh Circuit in Mary Beth G. provided two methods to distinguish from 
Bell the circumstances of a booking strip search policy.  The first, and more 
emphasized method, is to distinguish the types of prisoners being searched.92  As 
discussed above, this distinction is not made on solid ground, as the MCC detainees 
in Bell did not in fact entirely consist of “those awaiting serious federal charges.”93  
The second, stronger, approach is to distinguish between the circumstantial 
differences of a strip search employed after visits and a strip search applied to all 
arrestees as part of a facility’s booking process, noting that a booking search lacks 
the deterrent factor that a post-visit search may have.94  
However, it appears this Seventh Circuit case merely opened the floodgates for 
other courts to adopt the reasonable suspicion standard without first discussing 
whether the holding in Bell directly controls.95  After Mary Beth G., rare is the 
opinion that distinguishes the circumstances in Bell from those involved in a blanket 
strip search booking policy.96  The few courts that venture to make such a 
distinction, however, do so in convincing fashion.  In Roberts v. State of Rhode 
Island, the plaintiff was arrested and subject to an intake facility’s strip search policy 
for failure to appear at a judicial proceeding.97  The First Circuit distinguished the 
                                                                 
89 Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). 
90 Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15). 
91 Id. (emphasis added).  
92 Id. at 1272. 
93 Id.  
94 Id.  
95 See, e.g., Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343 (“This court recognizes that “reasonable suspicion” 
is sufficient to justify the strip search of a pretrial detainee.”); Swain, 117 F.3d at 7 (. . . courts 
have concluded that, to be reasonable under Wolfish, strip and visual body cavity searches 
must be justified by at least a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband 
or weapons . . . .  This court has held that the reasonable suspicion standard is the appropriate 
one for justifying strip searches in other contexts.”); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (“The 
decisions of all the federal courts of appeals that have considered the issue reached the same 
conclusion: a strip search of a person arrested for a traffic violation or other minor offense not 
normally associated with violence and concerning whom there is no individualized reasonable 
suspicion that the arrestee is carrying or concealing a weapon or other contraband, is 
unreasonable.”); Weber, 804 F.2d at 800 (“We . . . adopt the reasonable suspicion standard 
that governs in other circuits, which we think Wolfish suggests . . . .”).  
96 See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 111 (1st Cir. 2001); Shain v. Ellison, 273 
F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001).  
97 Roberts, 239 F.3d at 108.  
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circumstances, and thus, the justifications, of a booking strip search from the Bell 
post-contact visit search in two ways.98  First, the court distinguished the probability 
of the introduction of contraband in the two circumstances:  
Although inmates such as Roberts certainly have the opportunity to 
introduce contraband to the prison, and may have even done so in the past, 
it is far less likely that smuggling of contraband will occur subsequent to 
an arrest (when the detainee is normally in handcuffed custody) than 
during a contact visit that may have been arranged solely for the purpose 
of introducing contraband to the prison population.99 
In essence, the court stated that a strip search conducted as part of the booking 
process is less justified than a Bell search because it is less likely that contraband will 
be smuggled into the facility under the circumstances of a booking search when 
compared to the circumstances of a post-contact visit search.100  However, it should 
be noted that the Supreme Court in Bell recognized only one occasion where 
contraband was found in a post-contact visit search, and yet still found the search 
justified—stating the lack of contraband was likely due to the policy’s utility as 
deterrent.101  Yet, this potential argument was quickly struck down when the First 
Circuit stated its second important distinction from Bell, holding that “the deterrent 
rationale for the Bell search is simply less relevant [in the context of a booking 
search] given the essentially unplanned nature of an arrest and subsequent 
incarceration.”102  Therefore, the court held that the “only justification for this severe 
invasion is that [the facility in question] is a maximum security facility where 
arrestees mingle with the general population.”103  This, the court concluded, was not 
a sufficient enough “reason not to require reasonable suspicion for inmate body 
cavity searches.”104 
The Second Circuit employed similar reasoning in Shain v. Ellison.105  In Shain, 
the plaintiff was subject to Nassau County Correctional Center’s booking strip search 
policy after being arrested for first degree harassment, a “Class B” misdemeanor.106  
Using nearly an identical distinction as the First Circuit in Roberts, the court noted 
that “Bell authorized strip searches after contact visits, where contraband often is 
passed.”107  In contrast, the court recognized that “[i]t is far less obvious that 
misdemeanor arrestees frequently or even occasionally hide contraband in their 
                                                                 
98 Id. at 111.  
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.   
102 Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111.  
103 Id. at 112.  
104 Id.  
105 Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001).    
106 Id. at 60.  
107 Id. at 64 (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).   
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bodily orifices.”108  Again, in strikingly similar fashion to the First Circuit’s rationale 
in Roberts, the court dismissed the booking strip search’s justification as a deterrent 
when it observed that “[u]nlike persons already in jail who receive contact visits, 
arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested and thus an 
opportunity to hide something.”109 
The analysis of the First and Second Circuits highlight the two main methods for 
distinguishing between the justification, or lack thereof, behind a booking strip 
search policy and the justification behind a post-contact visit search policy, such as 
the one discussed in Bell.  Firstly, the above courts concluded that it was less likely 
that drugs would be smuggled into the facility during the booking process when 
compared to the planned contact visit, and thus, a search as intrusive as a strip search 
was not justified, or perhaps, not as justified, as it was in Bell.110  Secondly, both 
courts also found the booking strip search policy less justified because, in contrast to 
Bell, such a policy is not effective as a deterrent—as an arrest is generally unplanned 
and without notice.111  
However, in contrast to the two courts above, the majority of the courts have 
spent their efforts discussing what suffices as a “reasonable suspicion,” especially in 
the context of what circumstances are sufficient to meet such a standard.112  
Specifically, there has been much debate over whether the nature of the arrestee’s 
crime, in the context of a felony-misdemeanor distinction, should be determinative in 
establishing the reasonableness of a facility’s strip search.113  For instance, some 
early courts only applied the reasonable suspicion standard to misdemeanants or 
other minor offenders, remaining silent on the standard necessary for a reasonable 
search of felony offenders.114  In Dufrin v. Spreen, an early Sixth Circuit case, the 
court, without applying, or even mentioning, the reasonable suspicion standard, 
upheld the booking strip search of an arrestee detained for allegedly committing a 
“felony involving violence.”115  Yet, just four years after Dufrin, the Sixth Circuit, in 
                                                                 
108 Shain, 273 F.3d at 64.  
109 Id.  
110 See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111; Shain, 273 F.3d at 64. 
111 Id. 
112 See Kennedy v. L.A.P.D., 901 F.2d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1989); Thompson v. City of Los 
Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1989); Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, 823 F.2d 
955, 958 (6th Cir. 1987); Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1089 (6th Cir. 1983).  Gabriel 
Helmer’s article focuses directly on the issue of what standard should be applied to felony 
arrestees who are subject to a booking strip search.  Helmer, supra note 28, at 242-43.  The 
above cases were brought to this author’s attention by Helmer’s article, in which they are 
discussed at length.  
113 See Helmer, supra note 28. 
114 See, e.g., Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (“a person arrested for a traffic violation or other 
minor offense not normally associated with violence”); Weber, 804 F.2d at 802 (“arrestees 
charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses”); Giles, 746 F.2d at 617 (“arrestees 
charged with minor offenses”), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 
1040-41 n.1; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57 (“minor offenders”); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 
1272-73 (“minor offenders who were not inherently dangerous”). 
115 Dufrin, 712 F.2d at 1085.  
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Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, appeared to reinterpret this decision, 
stating: “automatic strip searches of all detainees violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment 
without a reasonable suspicion, based on the nature of the charge, the characteristics 
of the detainee, or the circumstances of the arrest.”116  Applying this rationale, the 
court upheld the search of an arrestee detained for menacing, a “violent 
misdemeanor,” as the nature of the alleged offense alone was interpreted to create 
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was concealing weapons or contraband.117  
Thus, the Sixth Circuit moved from a rationale that could have well been interpreted 
as distinguishing between felonies and misdemeanors, to a rationale that that 
distinguishes between violent and non-violent offenses, at least in the context of a 
strip search for weapons.  
Today, the reasonable suspicion standard appears to be required regardless of 
whether the alleged offense was a misdemeanor or felony. The Ninth Circuit, in 
Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Department, clearly lays out the modern use of the 
reasonable suspicion standard, in the context of a strip search:  
That this case involves a felony arrest does not alter the level of cause 
required to justify a visual body-cavity search.  Logically, the 
classification of the offense in some cases might inform the presence of 
suspicion, but it does not inform the level of suspicion required.  Indeed, 
the reasonable suspicion standard . . . prudently invites the consideration 
of the nature of the crime charged in determining the constitutionality of 
an individual search.118 
Thus, the nature of the crime itself may give rise a reasonable suspicion, but 
reasonable suspicion remains the standard regardless of whether the crime is a 
misdemeanor or felony.119 Yet, some courts still opine that a distinction exists, 
creating, as seen in Powell, some confusion.120  It is quite possible such confusion 
exists because modern courts, when ruling on policies applied to misdemeanor 
offenders, continue to cite earlier cases, such as Mary Beth G., that addressed the 
reasonable suspicion standard in the context of plaintiffs before them (for example, 
only minor misdemeanors)—creating, in effect, the illusion of a felony-misdemeanor 
distinction. 
                                                                 
116  Dobrowolskyj v. Jefferson County, 823 F.2d at 957 (emphasis added) (citing Weber, 
804 F.2d at 802; Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 1985); Stewart, 767 F.2d at 
157; Giles, 746 F.2d at 615; Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984); Mary Beth 
G., 723 F.2d at 1273; Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981); Fann v. City of 
Cleveland, 616 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F. Supp. 486, 490-
91 (E.D. Wis. 1979), aff’d, 620 F.2d 160, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). 
117 Dobrowolskyj, 823 F.2d at 958-59.  
118 Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 716, overruled on other grounds by Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224 (1991).  
119 Id.  
120 See Powell, 541 F.3d at 1309 (“some other circuits draw a distinction between whether 
the person has been arrested on a felony charge or just for a misdemeanor or some other lesser 
violation” (citing Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Giles, 746 F.2d at 
617, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 n.1; Mary Beth G., 723 
F.2d at 1272). 
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In spite of the courts’ difficulty in interpreting the standard, reasonable suspicion 
quickly became the accepted and unquestioned requirement for all strip searches to 
be conducted as a part of a facility’s booking process.121  This standard would 
remain on solid ground until 2005, when the Eleventh Circuit began questioning the 
reasonable suspicion standard in dicta122—a certain precursor to the court’s en banc 
decision in Powell v. Barrett three years later. 
III.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF BELL: THE POWELL V. BARRETT 
DECISION 
A.  Facts and Background 
On April 21, 2004, a class action suit was filed on behalf of eleven former 
inmates of Georgia’s Fulton County Jail.123  The plaintiffs objected to blanket strip 
searches that were conducted upon entering and/or returning to the jail.124  The 
plaintiffs were divided into one or more of three classes, based upon the search 
policy or policies to which they were subjected.125 One of these groups was the “AR 
[arrestee] group.”126 This group was subject to the jail’s booking policy, which 
required each inmate to be strip searched upon entering into the general jail 
population for the first time.127  Eight of the eleven former inmates were a part of 
this class.128  
                                                                
This particular portion of the booking process involved having the arrested 
person go into a large room with thirty to forty inmates, remove all of his clothes, 
and take a group shower.129 After the shower, each arrestee “either singly, or 
standing in a line with others, is visually inspected” by standing before a guard, 
“front and center, and showing his front and back sides while naked.”130  
 
121 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 20. 
122 Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Most of us are uncertain 
that jailers are required to have a reasonable suspicion of weapons or contraband before strip 
searching—for security and safety purposes—arrestees bound for the general jail 
population.”).  
123 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300.  
124 Id. 
125 Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007).  The three groups consisted 
of: “(1) blanket strip searches of arrestees as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail 
(AR Group); (2) blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released 
at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail was started or completed (AL 
Group); and (3) blanket strip searches of detainees who return from a court appearance after 
having been ordered released in state court (CR Group).”  Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 1297. 
129 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1301. 
130 Id. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss4/8
2009] STRIPPED OF JUSTIFICATION 911 
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground they were entitled to qualified 
immunity.131  The district court granted qualified immunity, assuming that the policy 
was unconstitutional, yet finding that the unconstitutionality was not clearly 
established.132  The district court believed this lack of clarity was a result of the 
Eleventh Circuit’s questioning of the reasonable suspicion standard in dicta.133  On 
interlocutory appeal, an Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, recognizing the 
unconstitutionality of the policy and holding that the unconstitutionality was clearly 
established, because the court was bound by precedent, not dicta.134  However, the 
panel addressed the Circuit’s past dicta when it recognized that “a majority of our 
Court has expressed uncertainty about our precedent holding that strip searches of 
arrestees to be placed in the jail’s general population, absent reasonable suspicion, 
violate the Fourth Amendment.”135  With the reasonable suspicion standard 
appropriately at issue before the court, the Eleventh Circuit granted an en banc 
rehearing addressing the constitutionality of the strip searches of the five plaintiffs 
who were searched absent reasonable suspicion (those searched solely as a result of 
the blanket policy).136  
B.  Examination of the Eleventh Circuit’s Rationale 
The Eleventh Circuit began by providing an in-depth analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bell v. Wolfish, going into far more detail than the analysis set 
forth above.137 The court thoroughly addressed the facts, holdings, and rationale of 
both lower courts, and finally, the Supreme Court’s decision.138 Once it finished 
addressing Bell, the court noted several cases that have “interpreted the Bell decision 
as requiring, or at least permitting lower courts to require, reasonable suspicion as a 
condition for detention facility strip searches.”139  The court moved quickly to assert 
its opinion on such interpretations, stating:  
                                                                 
131 Powell v. Barrett, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2005).  In determining whether 
government officials are entitled to qualified immunity, the well-established two-pronged test 
of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), is applied.  The first prong requires the court to 
determine whether the “plaintiff has alleged facts which, when taken in the light most 
favorable to [him], show that the defendant-official’s conduct violated a constitutionally 
protected right.”  Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Katz, 533 
U.S. at 201).  The second prong requires the court to “determine whether that right was clearly 
established such that a reasonable official, at the time the act was committed, would have  
understood that his behavior violated that right.”  Id. 
132 Powell, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 1349-50.  
133 Id. 
134 Powell, 496 F.3d at 1315-17. 
135 Id. at 1312 (citing Evans, 407 F.3d at 1278). 
136 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1300. 
137 Id. at 1303-06.  
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1306. 
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The Bell decision, correctly read, is inconsistent with the conclusion that 
the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion before an inmate 
entering . . . a detention facility may be subjected to a strip search that 
includes a body cavity inspection.  And the decision certainly is 
inconsistent with the conclusion that reasonable suspicion is required for 
detention facility strip searches that do not involve body cavity 
inspections.140 
The court proceeded to explain why.  “First, and most fundamentally,” Judge Carnes 
explained, “the Court in Bell addressed a strip search policy, not any individual 
searches conducted under it . . . .  The policy that the Court categorically upheld in 
Bell applied to all inmates . . . .  The policy did not require individualized 
suspicion.”141  
The court then delved into a multi-faceted critique of the reasonable suspicion 
courts.142  This critique included a lengthy interpretation of Justice Powell’s dissent 
in Bell and a discussion of the misdemeanor-felony distinction that many of the 
reasonable suspicion courts had made.143  In examining Justice Powell’s dissent, the 
court noted that the dissent “disagrees with only one aspect of the decision and that is 
the failure to require ‘some level of cause, such as a reasonable suspicion’ before the 
‘anal and genital searches described in this case’ can be performed.”144  Thus, the 
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that its sister circuits misread the “Bell decision as 
requiring, or at least permitting lower courts to require, reasonable suspicion as a 
condition for detention facility strip searches.”145  Here, the Eleventh Circuit ignored 
the fact that the courts subsequent to Bell, ruling on booking strip searches, 
established reasonable suspicion because they did not find Bell to be specifically 
controlling due to the factual distinctions between the post-contract visit search of 
Bell and the booking searches before them.146  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit assumed 
that Bell was controlling because the type of detainees were similar in both cases, 
reasoning that its sister circuits misread the dissent because “[i]f the majority had 
required reasonable suspicion for body cavity inspection strip searches of pretrial 
detainees, Justice Powell would not have dissented at all.”147 Thus, the Eleventh 
                                                                 
140 Id. at 1307.  In a typical analysis of a Bell case, it would be worthwhile to discuss the 
different degrees of searches that fall under the rule, as “scope of the particular intrusion” is 
indeed one of the factors listed in the Bell balancing test.  However, because the Eleventh 
Circuit holds that the searches in this context would have been valid even if they were body-
cavity searches (the more intrusive of the two), the distinction and analysis between the two, 
for the purpose of this Note, will not be made.  
141 Id. 
142 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307-13. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 1308.  
145 Id. at 1306-07. 
146 See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (refusing to be controlled by the specific 
outcome in Bell “because the particularized searches in that case were initiated under different 
circumstances”); see also supra Part II.C.2. 
147 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1308 (emphasis added). 
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Circuit criticized the conclusion that its sister circuits reached (that reasonable 
suspicion is required) while entirely ignoring the premise that conclusion was based 
upon.  
When discussing the alleged felony-misdemeanor distinction that had been 
applied by lower courts, the Eleventh Circuit rather bluntly stated that “[t]hose 
decisions are wrong.”148  The court used the Seventh Circuit holding in Mary Beth 
G. v. City of Chicago discussed above, as an example for these “wrong” decisions, 
stating that “[t]he difference between felonies and misdemeanors or other lesser 
offenses is without constitutional significance when it comes to detention facility 
strip searches.  It finds no basis in the Bell decision, in the reasoning of that decision, 
or in the real world of detention facilities.”149  To classify these cases as creating a 
misdemeanor-felony distinction is misguided.  As mentioned above, the Seventh 
Circuit in Mary Beth G. held that booking strip searches of minor misdemeanors was 
unreasonable absent reasonable suspicion.150  However, the Seventh Circuit did not 
state that reasonable suspicion was or was not required for felons or for more serious 
misdemeanors—it simply did not address the issue.  The court merely stated that the 
requirement for reasonable suspicion applied to minor-misdemeanors because those 
were the charges the plaintiffs in that case were facing.151  In fact, the term “felony” 
is not mentioned even once in the Seventh Circuit’s holding.  Thus, one would be 
hard-pressed to argue that such a holding created, let alone promoted, a felony-
misdemeanor distinction.  The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Mary Beth G. is similar 
to many early post-Bell cases in that they dealt primarily with booking strip searches 
of minor-misdemeanants and traffic offenders.152  But, as we saw above, in the Sixth 
Circuit’s change of analysis from Dufrin153 to Dobrowolskyj,154 and in the Ninth 
                                                                 
148 Id. at 1309-10 (citing Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57; Giles, 
746 F.2d at 617, overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1041 n.1; Mary 
Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272).  
149 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1310.  Judge Carnes summarizes these “felony-misdemeanor 
distinction” cases in the following manner:   
While those decisions vary in detail around the edges, the picture they paint is 
essentially the same.  The arrestee is charged with committing a misdemeanor or some 
other lesser violation and, while being booked into the detention facility, she is 
subjected to a strip search pursuant to the facility’s policy.  She later sues the officials 
asserting that the search was unconstitutional because the guards did not have any 
reasonable basis for believing that she was hiding contraband on her person.  See, e.g., 
Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1266.  In each cited case, the court of appeals concludes 
that because the plaintiffs were “minor offenders who were not inherently dangerous,” 
id. at 1272, detention officials could conduct a strip search only where there was “a 
reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband,” 
Giles, 746 F.2d at 617.  In each of the cases where reasonable suspicion was lacking, 
the search is held to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. at 1309-10. 
150 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272-73; see supra Part II.C.2. 
151 Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267. 
152 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114. 
153 Dufrin, 712 F.2d at 1089.  
154 Dobrowolskyj, 823 F.2d at 958. 
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Circuit’s more recent holding in Kennedy,155 any felony-misdemeanor distinction 
that once existed should be considered an anomaly, as it appears most courts apply 
the reasonable suspicion standard in such cases to all crimes, regardless of felony or 
misdemeanor status.156  Thus, it is both unfair and unwise to discredit the reasonable 
suspicion standard as a whole because of a few early and understandable 
misinterpretations of the holding in Bell.  
The majority of the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Powell is spent attempting to 
discredit the reasonable suspicion courts by demonstrating that such a standard is 
completely contradictory to the Supreme Court’s holding in Bell.157  Despite these 
apparently weak arguments, they are only pertinent if the reasonable suspicion courts 
are, in fact, controlled by the Bell decision.  Because the very existence of the 
reasonable suspicion requirement, in the context of booking strip searches, resulted 
from a court arguing that Bell was not controlling,158 the outcome of Powell hinges 
on this very issue.  
Unfortunately, the Eleventh Circuit did not mention this issue until the end of its 
argument and spent a relatively brief amount of time discussing it.159  The Eleventh 
Circuit did, however, concede that the “best hope for distinguishing Bell lies in the 
fact that [the plaintiffs] were strip searched as part of the booking process instead of 
after contact visits.”160  Nonetheless, the court quickly dismissed this notion, as it 
viewed an inmate entering the facility for the first time as similar to one returning 
after “one big and prolonged contact visit with the outside world.”161  
The court rejected the argument that such a strip search policy fails to be justified 
as a deterrent, noting that “[n]ot everyone who is arrested is surprised, seized, and 
slapped into handcuffs without a moment’s notice.”162  The court provided instances, 
including the instance of one purposefully getting arrested, where the anticipation 
and knowledge of impending arrest could give the arrestee the opportunity to obtain 
and conceal contraband in order to smuggle it into prison.163  “The point,” the 
Eleventh Circuit held, “is that there are plenty of situations where arrestees would 
have had at least as much opportunity to conceal contraband as would inmates on a 
contact visit, which is the situation Bell involved.”164 
In closing, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment rights of 
arrestees are “are not violated by a policy or practice of strip searching each one of 
                                                                 
155 Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714. 
156 See supra Part II.C.2. 
157 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1307-13. 
158 See, e.g., Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (refusing to be controlled by the specific 
outcome in Bell “because the particularized searches in that case were initiated under different 
circumstances”); see also supra Part II.C.2.  
159 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1313-14. 
160 Id. at 1313. 
161 Id. 
162 Id.  
163 Id. at 1314. 
164 Id. 
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them as part of the booking process, provided that the searches are no more intrusive 
on privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case.”165 
C.  Does Bell Control Booking Strip Searches? 
The majority, in its “[f]irst, and most fundamental[]” argument, noted that the 
“Court in Bell addressed a strip search policy, not any individual searches conducted 
under it,” in an attempt to compare the Bell search with the booking policy of the 
Fulton County Jail in its own case.166  Despite the substantive distinguishing facts 
between the searches, apparently the Eleventh Circuit believed that the procedural 
similarity of both searches (both were implemented via prison policy) alone was 
sufficient enough to reach the same result as the Supreme Court did in Bell: that the 
policy was reasonable.167  In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit displayed the major flaw 
that continued to appear throughout the opinion: the belief, in essence, that every 
prison’s blanket strip search policy (a policy that applies to all inmates, as opposed 
to individual inmates) is equally justified.  
As mentioned above, the Court in Bell provided subsequent courts with a 
balancing test to determine the reasonableness of strip searches in prison facilities: 
“Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is 
conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is 
conducted.”168  Comparing the circumstances in Bell with the circumstances in 
Powell, one can easily discover the factor at issue.  Firstly, the second and fourth 
factors (the manner of the search and place of the search, respectively) appear to be 
similar in both cases: both searches took place in a prison facility, and in neither case 
was there a claim that, outside of the search itself, the search was conducted in an 
inappropriate or abusive manner.169  In comparing the first factor, the scope of the 
intrusion, the distinctions between the two are unclear.  In Bell, the strip search 
employed was vividly described as a visual cavity search.170  In contrast, the strip 
search in Powell was vaguely described as a showing of one’s “front and back sides 
while naked.”171 A reasonable comparison of the description of two searches could 
                                                                 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 1307. 
167 Id.  The Eleventh Circuit stated that “[w]hen the Court stated that ‘these searches’ do 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, it obviously meant the searches that were before it, and 
those searches were conducted under a blanket policy without reasonable suspicion.  It really 
is that simple.”  Id.  Immediately thereafter, the court made a point to state “[i]f more is 
needed. . .” before continuing on with its lengthy rationale.  The existence of this phrase tends 
to indicate that the court at least had the notion that this argument was sufficient enough alone 
to reach the court’s ultimate holding.  Id.  
168 Bell, 441 U.S at 559. 
169 Id. at 560; Powell, 541 F.3d at 1301 (“Nor is there any allegation that the searches were 
conducted in an abusive manner.”) (citing Powell, 496 F.3d at 1310 n.28 (“We note that, in the 
instant case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the manner of the strip searches.”)). 
170 Bell, 441 U.S at 558 n.39 (“If the inmate is a male, he must lift his genitals and bend 
over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection.  The vaginal and anal cavities of female 
inmates also are visually inspected.”). 
171 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1301.  
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lead one to conclude that the Powell search was only slightly less invasive than the 
search in Bell, if at all.  Therefore, based on judging the first three factors alone, it 
would be logical to conclude that the search in Powell was reasonable, as the only 
difference between the two is that the Powell search may have been less intrusive 
than the search that was upheld in Bell.  Yet, the true distinction between the 
circumstances in Bell and Powell does not rest in these three factors of the Bell 
balancing test.  Rather, the true distinction rests on the remaining factor: the 
justification for initiating the search, which is where the two searches divide sharply.  
arch.  
                                                                
The majority unfairly, and without much thought, deems the justifications behind 
a post-contact visit search as equal to that of a booking policy search.  As discussed 
earlier in Roberts172 and Shain,173 such comparison should not be made because 
there exist two fundamental factual distinctions between the two types of searches: 
(1) the frequency of contraband being smuggled into the institutions for each type of 
search; and (2) the effectiveness as a deterrent for each type of se
It is well-established that inmates will go to great lengths to smuggle contraband 
into prison facilities.174  Such methods employed range from the simple, such as 
hiding drugs in the mail, to the elaborate, such as night-time airdrops into the prison 
yard.175  The consensus of scholarly sources cite mail, visits, and the bribery and 
coercion of staff as the most commonly used methods of  infiltrating contraband into 
a prison facility,176 with visits being the most common method of these three.177  It 
also has been noted that the “majority of illegal drugs introduced during visiting are 
done in body cavities.”178  In contrast, while such authorities concede that inmates 
are likely to try anything, none make specific mention of the infiltration of drugs 
 
172 Roberts, 239 F.3d at 111. 
173 Shain, 273 F.3d at 64. 
174 See LOUIS KONTOS & DAVID C. BROTHERTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GANGS 100 (2008) 
(mentioning the following methods of getting illegal drugs into prisons: visits (“[t]he most 
common [way]”), throwing drugs over the prison wall, air drops, recruiting/coercing 
correctional officers); CHAD TRULSON, The Social World of the Prisoner, in PRISONS: TODAY 
AND TOMORROW 79, 111 (Joycelyn M. Pollock ed., 2d ed. 2006) (citing the use of “[v]isitors, 
contractors, inmates, and even staff” as methods for smuggling); MARK S. FLEISHER, BEGGARS 
AND THIEVES: LIVES OF URBAN STREET CRIMINALS 171 (1995) (citing infiltration of 
contraband resulting from visits and staff bribes); WILLIAM R. BELL, PRACTICAL CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 8-14 (2002) (citing, under the subchapter 
“Methods of Drug Introduction in Prisons,” the following: mail, visiting, drug drops, work 
programs, and staff). 
175 See BELL, supra note 174; KONTOS & BROTHERTON, supra note 174. 
176 See BELL, supra note 174; KONTOS & BROTHERTON, supra note 174; TRULSON, supra 
note 174. 
177 See KONTOS & BROTHERTON, supra note 174; Mark S. Fleisher & Richard H. Rison, 
Gang Management in Corrections, in PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND 
THEORY 232, 234 (Peter M. Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., 1st ed. 1999) (“[t]o sustain 
prison drug and other crime activity [prison gangs] depend on street contacts . . . still on the 
street to smuggle rock cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs into jail and prison visiting 
rooms.”) (emphasis added).  
178 BELL, supra note 174, at 9.  
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occurring as a result of improper booking techniques, nor do they mention the 
concept that some detainees may be getting themselves purposefully arrested with 
the intent of having an opportunity to smuggle contraband into the prison as a 
result.179 
Thus, it appears booking strip search policies only act as a deterrent under rare 
circumstances.  The plain truth is that the vast majority of arrestees do not have time 
to plan or anticipate their impending arrest, while all inmates are entitled to planned 
contact visits.  Judge Barkett, in writing the dissenting opinion in the en banc Powell 
decision, correctly opines that “[t]he majority’s assertion that pretrial detainees . . . 
might anticipate their arrests or that gang members might deliberately get arrested in 
order to smuggle weapons and drugs into jail is unwarranted speculation in this 
case.”180  Such speculation is unwarranted because the frequency of such events 
occurring appears to be so low, especially in comparison to contact-visit smuggling.  
The fact that the majority finds it perfectly reasonable to rely on such rare instances 
where a booking strip search may act as a deterrent demonstrates the lack of 
importance the court places on the “justification” factor of the Bell balancing test.  
Any rational person could conclude that an intrusive practice employed to remedy or 
deter a problem that occurs with regular frequency is much more justified in its use 
than the same practice that is employed to remedy or deter a problem that occurs far 
less often.  Yet, the Eleventh Circuit fails to apply such logic to the searches of Bell 
and Powell, considering them, in all practicality, equally justified. 
This is not to say that the Eleventh Circuit’s arguments are completely without 
merit.  Indeed, there are security risks involved with incoming arrestees—especially, 
as the Eleventh Circuit noted, with those who have an anticipation of their arrest.  
However, the Eleventh Circuit’s solution to these risks—approving a blanket strip 
search policy that is applied to all incoming arrestees—is simply far too broad and 
unjustified.  Those who fall under the policy will be anyone entering the facility’s 
general population for the first time—from minor traffic offenders to those accused 
of violating housing or safety codes.181  Certainly there will be instances when these 
types of offenders should be searched, but one should not forget that nearly all of the 
federal circuits prior to Powell held that searches of these offenders may still take 
place if reasonable suspicion exists.182  The Eleventh Circuit should not have 
allowed the policy to extend to all of arrestees for the sake of convenience and 
extreme deference to prison facility operators.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
would be far more reasonable, and more consistent with its own rationale, if it 
applied its holding to only those arrestees who had the ability to anticipate their 
arrest.  Or perhaps, for the sake of consistency among the federal circuits, the 
Eleventh Circuit could have promoted the use of the arrestee’s knowledge of 
impending arrest as another factor in establishing reasonable suspicion.  
                                                                 
179 See sources cited supra notes 174, 177.  
180 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1318.  
181 Id. at 1301. 
182 See, e.g., Wilson, 251 F.3d at 1343; Swain, 117 F.3d at 7; Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255; 
Weber, 804 F.2d at 802; Giles, 746 F.2d at 617; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57;  Mary Beth G., 
723 F.2d at 1273. 
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As discussed above, the facts (and thus, the justification behind) the two searches 
are clearly distinguishable. Therefore, the Bell decision should not specifically 
control strip search policies outside the contact-visit searches.  The facts of the 
booking search demonstrate less justification to implement such a policy because the 
frequency of such attempts are low and its factor as a deterrent only exists in rare and 
individual circumstances.  Thus, the courts subsequent to Bell and prior to Powell 
have been appropriate in applying the Bell balancing test and concluding that 
individualized reasonable suspicion is required for the extremely intrusive and 
humiliating act of a strip search by prison officials during a facility’s booking 
process.  
D.  Post-Powell Reactions from the Sister Circuits  
A year after the its decision in Powell, the Eleventh Circuit remains alone in its 
holding that reasonable suspicion is not required to conduct a strip search of an 
arrestee as part of a prison’s booking process.183  While a handful of post-Powell 
district-level courts have declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit,184 none has done so 
in a more thorough and convincing fashion as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
Allison v. GEO Group, Inc.185  
In Allison, Judge DuBois succinctly touched upon many of the points discussed 
above.  The court criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s failure to properly understand its 
sister circuits’ interpretation of Bell under the context of a policy requiring the strip 
search of all arrestees during booking:   
[T]he Supreme Court, on the facts before it, approved a blanket policy 
requiring strip searches for all inmates following contact visits as 
reasonable and did not require searches conducted pursuant to that policy 
to be based on individualized reasonable suspicion.  The Court did not 
have occasion to rule on the reasonableness of custodial strip searches in 
other circumstances or under what circumstances reasonable suspicion 
might be required . . . .  Other courts did not hold that Bell “requires” 
reasonable suspicion; they held that Bell requires reasonableness and that 
reasonableness, in certain circumstances, requires that searches be based 
on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing measured against some 
objective standard such as reasonable suspicion.186 
Accordingly, DuBois concluded that the Eleventh Circuit was short-sighted in its 
attempt to “demonstrate that other circuit opinions were wrongly decided or that they 
misapplied Bell.”187 
                                                                 
183 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 508-
11 (D. N.J. 2009); Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1138 (E.D. Cal.  2009); 
Young v. County of Cook, 616 F. Supp. 2d 834, 847 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Allison v. GEO Group, 
Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 433, 456-62 (E.D. Pa. 2009).  
184 See sources cited supra note 183. 
185 Allison v. GEO Group, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
186 Id. at 459. 
187 Id. 
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As a whole, the opinion conveys the notion that Judge DuBois was greatly 
concerned with the breadth of the policy that the Eleventh Circuit upheld.188  When 
discussing the likelihood of the infiltration, specifically in response to the Eleventh 
Circuit’s concept that “an inmate’s initial entry into a detention facility might be 
viewed as coming after one big and prolonged contact visit with the outside 
world,”189 DuBois held: 
Although recent arrestees might have more opportunity to possess 
contraband than inmates, opportunity alone does not change the likelihood 
that a person arrested on non-violent, non-drug offenses actually 
possesses contraband.  It also does not increase the chance that the 
contraband will be secreted in such a way that it will not be discovered by 
less invasive searches.190  
Likewise, when discussing the possibility of those deliberately subjecting themselves 
to arrest, Judge DuBois did not discount it as “unwarranted speculation,” as Judge 
Barkett did in her dissent;191 rather, he addressed it as a concern that is best remedied 
under the individualized reasonable suspicion standard, stating: “In cases where 
arrestees self surrender or deliberately subject themselves to arrest, officials may 
well have reasonable suspicion to conduct an intake strip search”192 
It appears DuBois is clearly (and reasonably) concerned with the most disturbing 
consequence of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision: the innocents who will be forced to 
suffer the indignities of a strip search as a result of prison facilities’ security 
concerns remedied through overly-simple and broad blanket policies.  In response, 
DuBois appears to quietly promote the continued use of the reasonable suspicion 
standard; whose individualized application, yet “relatively low burden in the Fourth 
Amendment context,”193 provides the best balance of the right of the individual 
against the legitimate security interests of the prison facility.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Perhaps a rarely cited decision from the Northern District of Indiana understood 
the issue best.194  “The factual setting of Bell v. Wolfish . . . is light years away from 
                                                                 
188 Id. at 461-62 (“The hypothetical existence of reasonable arrestee strip searches does 
not, however, automatically justify an overinclusive blanket policy.”). 
189 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1313. 
190 Allison, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 460. 
191 Powell, 541 F.3d at 1318. 
192 Allison, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 461.  
193 Id. at 455 (citing Weber, 804 F.2d at 802); see Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 714-15. 
194 Bovey v. City of Lafayette, 586 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ind. 1984).  In Bovey, the plaintiff 
was a lawyer (described as “a well educated, intellectually sophisticated, aggressive and 
sometimes intimidating advocate, both in and out of the courtroom, who is both blessed and 
cursed with an advanced case of self-righteousness”) who was pulled over by a police officer 
(described as man “who has maintained his athletic handsomeness from twenty years ago 
when he was Mr. Basketball in Indiana, which under the prevailing cultural Hoosier mores is 
the rough equivalent to secular sainthood . . . [and] has the arrogance and aggressiveness born 
of public adulation.”) for driving 49 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. speed zone.  Id. at 1461-62.  At the 
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[the context of a booking strip search]” exclaimed Judge Sharp, holding: “There is 
little justification for the strip search of [the plaintiff] by anyone here.”195  Because 
of the distinctions discussed above, Judge Sharp opined that the legal doctrine in Bell 
should be limited to the context it served, as legal doctrines “derive meaning and 
content from the circumstances that give rise to them and from the purposes they are 
designed to serve.  To these they are bound as is a live tree to its roots.”196 Even the 
balancing test provided in Bell itself states: “In each case it requires a balancing of 
the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the 
search entails.”197 
Because of the factual differences between the two searches, the specific holding 
set forth in Bell should not apply outside of the contact-visit context.  In particular, 
the decision in Bell, permitting mandated strip searches after visits absent specific 
cause, should not be extended to specifically control the less justified blanket policy 
of strip searching arrestees during booking.  Courts should use the balancing test in 
Bell as a point of reference, but continue to apply the reasonable suspicion standard 
until the Supreme Court holds otherwise.  Simply, the rights of all should not 
sacrificed for the sake of extreme deference to absolute prison security.  
 
 
stop, these two colorful personalities clashed, leading to Bovey’s arrest after forcefully 
resisting to being handcuffed.  Id. at 1463.  After being charged with “Speeding, Resisting 
Law Enforcement, Assault and Battery on a Policeman and Disorderly Conduct,” Bovey was 
subsequently subject to “the Tippecanoe County Sheriff to strip-search everyone who was to 
be placed in the jail.”  Id. at 1463-64.  He was subject to a body-cavity strip search.  Id. at 
1464.  
195 Id. at 1470.  
196 Id. (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 (1957)). Justice Black’s statement on legal 
doctrines is best understood in full: 
Legal doctrines are not self-generated abstract categories.  They do not fall from the 
sky; nor are they pulled out of it.  They have a specific jurisdical origin and etiology. 
They derive meaning and content from the circumstances that gave rise to them and 
from the purposes they were designed to serve.  To these they are bound as is a live 
tree to its roots.  Doctrines . . . must be placed in their historical setting.  They cannot 
be wrenched from it and mechanically transplanted into an alien, unrelated context 
without suffering mutilation or distortion.  “If a precedent involving a black horse is 
applied to a case involving a white horse, we are not excited.  If it were an elephant or 
an animal ferae naturae or a chose in action, then we would venture into thought.  The 
difference might make a difference.  We really are concerned about precedents chiefly 
when their facts differ somewhat from the facts in the case at bar.  Then there is a gulf 
or hiatus that has to be bridged by a concern for principle and a concern for practical 
results and practical wisdom.” 
Reid, 354 U.S. at 50-51 (quoting THOMAS REED POWELL, VAGARIES AND VARIETIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 36 (The Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1955)).  
197 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added).  
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